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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
PIONEER STATE BANK, a Utah 
corporation. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
DENNIS G. CHURCH, et al. , 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 20346 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Title Guarantee Company ("Title Guarantee") refuses to 
deal with or even acknowledge the strict fiduciary duty which 
all the Respondents owed to Pioneer State Bank ("Pioneer") in 
connection with the transactions. Although it is certainly 
understandable that Title Guarantee would like to forget the 
fiduciary duty which existed, that duty simply cannot be 
ignored. Whether discussing the original issuance of the 
fraudulent policy to Pioneer or the reconveyance of the Taylor 
property which was fraudulently obtained from Pioneer or Title 
Guarantee's conduct when it found out about the access 
problem, the fiduciary responsibilities owed by Respondents to 
Pioneer are at the very core of this case. The evidence below 
was simply overwhelming that Respondents never once attempted 
to fulfill their fiduciary obligations to Pioneer, but always 
acted solely to protect their own conflicting interests. 
Respondents were absolutely obligated in connection with the 
subject transactions to fully disclose to Pioneer all relevant 
facts bearing on Pioneer's policy on Lake Meadows, 
Respondents1 abject failure to do so renders then liable for 
Pioneer's damages. 
OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT TITLE GUARANTEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Appellant Pioneer State Bank {"Pioneer") objects to the 
following "facts" contained in the numbered paragraphs of 
Respondent Title Guarantee Company's ("Title Guarantee") Brief: 
Paragraph 3: Title Guarantee states that the borrowers 
had already obtained an interest in the Taylor property 
providing access to the Lake Meadows Subdivision by reason of 
a tax deed some years prior to 1979. Although this claim was 
made at trial, no tax deed was introduced in evidence nor was 
any evidence introduced that the purported title was valid. 
In fact, when the borrowers obtained the loan they knew that 
Taylor owned the Taylor property and were trying to negotiate 
a trade with him to obtain the Taylor property. [R. 571 line 
17 - 572 line 16] The borrowers didn't even know if the 
purported tax deed covered all of the Taylor property 
necessary for access. [R. 624 lines 2-8] Title Guarantee's 
claim the borrowers had a valid tax title is completely 
rebutted by the fact that in 1980 the borrowers stipulated to 
a Judgment that they in fact had no right, title or interest 
in the Taylor property. [Ex. 7] 
Paragraph 11: Title Guarantee claims that the policy 
issued by Rocky Mountain to Pioneer "accurately stated 
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Pioneer's priority position in regard, to Lake Meadows • . -. " 
This statement I:> misleading. In fact, the polio;- insured 
Mo.- ."•... :C:./ewc.:y owned the Taylor property and that Lake 
Meadows Subdivision had adequate access. Rocky Mountain knew 
that the borrowers did not have ! i M ; I < "cho Caylcr property 
and that Lake Meadows did not have adequate access* [R. 5 71 
line 17 - 57 2 line 2] 
Paragraph 12: Title Guarantee states that negotiations 
with Taylor continued for many nonths after Taylor found out 
about the forgery. In fact, as soc "< - T . .*! v.- "ourr; -. . a.x;ut 
tlle ..'UJL . die borrowers knew that no d ?.;-..!. could be made with 
Taylor to acquire the Taylor property because Taylor was 
demanding so much i '* won]-1 n t ho L'conouu cully feasible to 
develop the property In Ray Maag's words, Taylor v/as 
"blackmailing" the borrowers. [R. 707 lines 11--1.T; 703 lines 
22-24] 
Paragraph 14; Title Guarantee appears to contend that 
Pioneer he- "I knowledge of the T,?ylivi; quiet" ' it]"j IOLI^I. There 
waj ^ -:;•(.; iv...y no evidence presented that Pioneer v/as ever 
served with a Summons and Complaint or ever knew about the 
lawsuit and the Court did M'\h so fin:"!. T.n fact, the Complaint 
in the quiet title action was unilatercilly dismissed against 
Pioneer by Taylor without any involvement of Pioneer. [Ex, 3] 
Paragraph IS: Title Guarantee claims that Douglas 
Church showed Pioneer that the property he requested Pioneer 
to reconvey was the Taylor property providing access to the 
subdivision, t:hat there was a quiet title action pending and 
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since the loan covered the property a reconveyance was 
needed. Douglas Cnurch in fact testified that at some point 
in time he showed Pioneer a copy of the plat map but couldn't 
remember 'whether he showed Pioneer the plat when the 
reconveyance was obtained. [R. 622 line 17 - 623 line 15] 
Church further testified that he didnft want Pioneer to know 
about the Taylor property problem because he was afraid 
Pioneer v/ould immediately call the loan due and that he acted 
like the request for reconveyance was "no big deal". Douglas 
Church admittedly didnft tell Pioneer that the property being 
reconveyed was the access to the subdivision or that he needed 
the reconveyance because of the forged deed or that the 
reconveyance would preclude development of the property. The 
Trial Court did not find that Pioneeer knew the property being 
reconveyed was the access or that Douglas Cnurch told Pioneer 
the true facts. [R. 574 line 2 - 575 line 2; 576 line 14 - 579 
line 21] 
Paragraph 23: Title Guarantee implies that Pioneer 
initiated a proposal to Title Guarantee's attorney, David 
Hodgson, to sell the property to Title Guarantee for 
$100,000. In fact, it v/as Hodgson who solicited an offer from 
Pioneer. Hodgson had no authority from Title Guarantee to 
solicit the offer and Title Guarantee v/as not interested in 
purchasing the defective Lake Meadows Subdivision at any price 
so no negotiations ensued. [R. 721 line 20 - 723 line 12; 729 
line 3 - 730 line 10] 
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Paragraph 24: Title Guarantee claims the reason David 
Hodgson did not discuss with Pioneer his discoveries about the 
access r^o'olj:.i "in greater decaiv" wa: because Rusty Davidson 
said he had done some investigation on the property. There 
was ab s o 1 u t e 1 y n o discussion c o n c e r n i n g t]i e a c c ess problem. 
[R. 561 lines 5-1 7] Further, :.n his deposition, Mr. Hodgson 
testified the reason he didn't tell Mr. Davidson about the 
problem was that Mr* Hodgson1s investigation was not complete. 
[Hodgson Depo.# p. 41 lines 4-24] 
Paragraph 26. Pioneer1 s \^ ;v-nise>- testified, that the 
value >f Lci]\e Meadows as ? subdivision v/as &144, 000 and the 
value as raw ground was only $36,000. [>i, 751 lines 6-19; 7•"""-G 
lines 6-121 The Tr i a 1 Ct:u\" t opo c 1 i i c:a I 1 y I"oaihi c<ia t ±Jak e 
Meadows is only v/orth $36,000 as undeveloped raw ground 
because Lake Meadows does not have the two accesses necessary 
to develop it as a subdi^ vision. [R. 425- -426; Findings 14-16] 
ARGUMENT 
1
• PIONEER IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ON THE POLICY. 
A. The ^77,000 Payment Was Not Made Under Pioneer's 
Policy and Cannot Be Credited to That Policy. 
The principal ground upon which. m il;Le Guarantee 
originally denied Pioneer's claim and defended the action 
below \-as that che £7 7,0^0 payment which Title Guarantee made 
' ^ n"" ' : February 1 _")S2 was made under Pioneer1 s policy so 
that this payment fully paid the policy, The Trial Court 
rejected this contention and found that the payment was made 
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t o s e t t l e c l a i m s made on t h e P i n e c r e s t A s s o c i a t e s and L o c k h a r t 
p o l i c i e s b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e payment c o u l d 
somehow be c r e d i t e d a g a i n s t P i o n e e r ' s p o l i c y . 
T i t l e G u a r a n t e e does n o t now even a r g u e t h a t t h e 
payment was made under P i o n e e r ' s p o l i c y . F u r t h e r , T i t l e 
G u a r a n t e e makes no a t t e m p t t o s u p p o r t t h e T r i a l C o u r t ' s 
e r r o n e o u s c o n c l u s i o n of law t h a t t h e payment can be c r e d i t e d 
a g a i n s t P i o n e e r ' s p o l i c y . The T r i a l C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n of law 
was in e r r o r and s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d . P i o n e e r n e i t h e r n e e d e d 
no r r e q u e s t e d p r o t e c t i o n on i t s p o l i c y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e 
condominium u n i t s . T i t l e G u a r a n t e e c a n ' t e r a s e P i o n e e r ' s 
p r o t e c t i o n by s a t i s f y i n g a t i t l e d e f e c t on o t h e r p o l i c i e s 
which d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e a t i t l e d e f e c t on P i o n e e r ' s p o l i c y . 
B. The F a c t Tha t t h e $ 7 7 / 0 0 0 Payment P a i d Off t h e 
Remaining Debt t o P i o n e e r i s I r r e l e v a n t . 
The p r i m a r y b a s i s on which T i t l e G u a r a n t e e now c l a i m s 
t h a t P i o n e e r i s n o t c o v e r e d on t h e p o l i c y i s t h a t b e c a u s e t h e 
$ 7 7 , 0 0 0 payment i n F e b r u a r y 1982 p a i d o f f t h e r e m a i n i n g d e b t 
owed t o P i o n e e r on t h e l o a n t o t h e b o r r o w e r s , t h e p o l i c y on 
Lake Meadows was e x t i n g u i s h e d . T h i s g r o u n d was n o t r e l i e d on 
by T i t l e G u a r a n t e e when i t o r i g i n a l l y d e n i e d P i o n e e r ' s c l a i m 
and T i t l e G u a r a n t e e s h o u l d be p r e c l u d e d from a s s e r t i n g t h i s 
g r o u n d . [ S e e c a s e s c i t e d i n P i o n e e r ' s i n i t i a l B r i e f , p p . 
1 7 - 1 3 ] Moreove r , t h i s a rgumen t i g n o r e s t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e 
p o l i c y and f l i e s i n t h e f a c e of common s e n s e . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
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Title Guarantee has not cited one authority which supports 
this novel proposition. 
The plain fact of the matter is that at the time the 
$77,000 payment was made, Pioneer had already gone out of 
pocket over $81,000 to purchase Lake Meadov/s at foreclosure 
sale in reliance upon the title policy. Paragraph 2(a) of the 
policy [Ex. P-3] expressly provides that the policy continues 
in force after Pioneer acquires Lake Meadows by foreclosure or 
any other manner which discharges the lien of the insured 
Trust Deed. Title Guarantee's argument concerning paragraph 
2(a) ignores the fact that this paragraph also provides that 
amounts advanced by Pioneer to protect the collateral are 
included within the debt insured. Clearly, the amount paid by 
Pioneer to purchase Lake Meadows is covered by this 
provision. Paragraph 2(b) of the policy specifically provides 
that the coverage remains in effect so long as Pioneer retains 
an "estate or interest in the land". 
It is undisputed that if Title Guarantee is correct in 
contending that the coverage only remained in effect as long 
as the borrov/ers owed Pioneer a debt, any time a lender 
forecloses on its collateral the lender would lose the 
Title Guarantee claims that if the $77,000 payment 
does not extinguish the policy, the payment was 
gratuitous and Pioneer would be unjustly enriched. 
This contention does not make sense. In consideration 
of the $77,000 payment, Pioneer released its lien on 
the two condominiums, thus allowing Title Guarantee to 
clear title for Pinecrest and Lockhart. 
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protection of the title policy to the extent of the Lender1 s 
bid at the foreclosure sale. Thus, if the lender bids in the 
full amount of the debt, the debt would be fully paid and the 
policy would be completely extinguished. If the lender's 
title later fails, the policy would provide the lender with 
absolutely no protection. Cven in the circumstance where the 
lender does not bid in the full amount of its debt at the 
foreclosure sale, the lender's insurance coverage would be 
drastically reduced. For example, if a lender is owed 
$100,000 and purchases the collateral at foreclosure sale for 
$95,000, the insurance coverage would be reduced to $5,000 
even if title subsequently fails completely. These results 
are absurd. The whole purpose of a title insurance policy is 
to protect the lender in the event the borrower fails to pay 
the debt and the lender acquires the property through 
foreclosure. Title Guarantee's argument, if adopted, would to 
a very significant degree render the protection afforded by 
the policy an illusion. There is simply no question that the 
amount paid by a lender to purchase the property at a 
foreclosure sale is part of the "debt" covered by the policy. 
C. Pioneer Did Not Cause Its Own Damage by Purchasing 
Lake Meadows at The Trustee's Sale. 
Title Guarantee now argues for the first time that 
Pioneer caused its own damages by "voluntarily" acquiring 
title to the Lake Ileadows Subdivision at the Utah Valley Bank 
Trustee's Sale in December 1981 as an "investment" when 
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Pioneer supposedly knew it had earlier reconveyed the Taylor 
property* This argument is without merit. 
The Trial Court did not find, and there is absolutely 
no evidence to support Title Guarantee's claim, that Pioneer 
knew it had already reconveyed the access property necessary 
for Lake Meadows to be a valid subdivision. Tine evidence was 
to the contrary. Douglas Church, the President of Rocky 
Mountain, intentionally led Pioneer to believe that the 
property Pioneer was reconveying had nothing to do with 
Pioneer's loan. Pioneer was certainly entitled to rely on 
what its title insurer represented. Ilr. Church admittedly did 
not tell Pioneer that the property the borrowers wanted 
reconveyed was the Taylor property which provided the main 
access to the subdivision and without which the subdivision 
could not be developed. Mr. Church admitted that he acted 
like the reconveyance was "no big deal" because he didn't want 
Pioneer to find out about the Taylor problem as he was afraid 
Pioneer would immediately call the loan due. Mr. Church and 
the other borrov/ers, as the sole officers, directors and 
shareholders of Rocky Mountain, owed Pioneer a fiduciary duty 
to fully disclose all facts relevant to the reconveyance. 
This duty was totally ignored. 
Title Guarantee has continually attempted in this 
action to escape responsibility on the policy by arguing that 
Pioneer "voluntarily" purchased Lake Meadows with the 
expectation of making a profit. This position is 
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nonsensical. Pioneer purchased the property in order to 
protect its security interest in the property but did in fact 
believe that Lake Meadows could be developed and sold at a 
2 
profit. [R. 518 line 14 - 519 line 5] But, why would any 
lender pay off a prior lien at a foreclosure sale if the 
lender didn't think it could turn around and sell the 
collateral for more than the lender paid? More importantly, 
the reason Pioneer purchased Lake Meadows is totally 
irrelevant. There is no provision in the policy that there is 
no coverage if the property is purchased with the expectation 
of making a profit. If title to Lake Meadows had been as 
represented in the policy, Pioneer would have no complaint 
whether Pioneer suffered a loss or enjoyed a profit from the 
property. Pioneer is only seeking compensation in this action 
for the damages caused by the failure of title. 
II. RESPONDENTS COMMITTED FRAUD UPON PIONEER. 
Title Guarantee argues that the Trial Court based on 
disputed evidence rejected Pioneer's fraud claims, To the 
contrary, there is no substantial evidence to support the 
dismissal of these claims. 
In this regard, Title Guarantee continues to attempt 
to make something of the fact that after purchasing 
the property Pioneer offered to sell Lake Meadows to 
Title Guarantee for $100,000. In fact, although he 
had no authority to do so, David Hodgson, Title 
Guarantee's attorney, solicited an offer to sell from 
Pioneer. However, when he checked with Title 
Guarantee about purchasing Lake Meadows, Title 
Guarantee had absolutely no interest in purchasing the 
property at any price and no negotiations ensued. 
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A. Rocky Mountain Issued a Fraudulent Policy* 
Rocky Mountain and the borrowers knew in early October 
1979, six weeks before the title policy was issued on November 
19, 197 9, that they had no deal with Taylor and that no deal 
could be made. Nevertheless, they issued the fraudulent 
policy which did not disclose in any respect the Taylor deed 
had been forged, that Taylor owned the Taylor property or that 
Taylor made a claim to the Taylor property. Rocky Mountain 
and the borrowers knew at the time the loan from Pioneer was 
obtained that Taylor had an interest in the property. [R. 571 
line 17 - 572 line 9] These facts were never disclosed to 
Pioneer even after in 1980 the borrowers stipulated they nad 
no right, title or interest in the Taylor property. Even if 
the borrowers and Rocky Mountain would have disclosed these 
facts when they settled the Taylor lawsuit in 1980, Pioneer 
would not have purchased the Lake Meadows property over a 
year later to protect its collateral. 
The cases cited in Pioneer1s Brief [p. 24], which are 
not disputed by Title Guarantee, demonstrate beyond doubt that 
even if one ignores reality and assumes that the borrowers and 
Rocky Mountain initially thought back in 1979 that the 
borrowers had a valid tax title and a deal with Taylor, that 
when they later undeniably learned these facts were false, 
they had an absolute duty to disclose that information to 
Pioneer. The failure of Rocky Mountain and the borrowers to 
do so constitutes fraud regardless of their intent. Blodgett 
v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Ut. 1978). 
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Title Guarantee attempts to argue that even if the 
borrowers committed fraud, Title Guarantee is not liable for 
that fraud because the borrowers (as opposed to Rocky 
Mountain) were not Title Guarantee's agents. However/ the 
borrov/ers were the sole shareholders, officers and directors 
of Rocky Mountain and caused Rocky Mountain to issue the 
fraudulent policy. The borrowers are the only individuals 
through whom Rocky Mountain could act and the borrowers1 fraud 
in connection with the policy was the fraud of Rocky Mountain. 
B. Title Guarantee is Liable to Pioneer For Failure to 
Disclose Pioneer's Claim. 
Title Guarantee knew about the access problem by at 
least the Summer or Fall of 1981. [R. 596 line 7 - 599 line 
5] Title Guarantee admits that David Hodgson, the attorney 
hired by Title Guarantee to investigate the claims made on the 
condominium units by Pinecrest Associates and Lockhart, did 
not disclose to Pioneer the Lake Ileadows access problem even 
though he knew about it at least by January of 1982. Title 
Guarantee attempts to excuse this failure by arguing that the 
reason Hodgson did not disclose the access problem was because 
"any reasonable person would assume Pioneer was fully aware of 
the situation." [Reply Brief, p.21] Title Guarantee further 
argues that "the Trial Court properly concluded that Pioneer 
was fully informed and that nothing was intentionally or 
unintentionally concealed from Pioneer by Title Guarantee." 
[Reply Brief, p.22] These claims are not supported by the 
record. 
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F i r s t , c o n t r a r y t o T i t l e G u a r a n t e e ' s a r g u m e n t , t h e 
T r i a l C o u r t d i d n o t f i n d t h a t P i o n e e r was f u l l y in fo rmed and 
t h a t n o t h i n g was i n t e n t i o n a l l y or u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y c o n c e a l e d 
from P i o n e e r by T i t l e G u a r a n t e e - The T r i a l Cour t s i m p l y found 
t h a t " P l a i n t i f f p r e s e n t e d no p e r s u a s i v e e v i d e n c e of m a l i c e , 
bad f a i t h or f r a u d on t h e p a r t of T i t l e G u a r a n t e e . " [R. 426 , 
F i n d i n g 19] T h i s F i n d i n g i s n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e a s 
d e m o n s t r a t e d i n P i o n e e r ' s o p e n i n g B r i e f , 
Second , t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t h a t P i o n e e r knew a b o u t 
t h e a c c e s s p r o b l e m . Hodgson t e s t i f i e d i n h i s d e p o s i t i o n t h a t 
he d i d n ' t t e l l P i o n e e r a b o u t t h e a c c e s s p r o b l e m b e c a u s e even 
t hough h e h a d b e e n i n fo rmed of t h e p r o b l e m h e w a s n ' t c o m p l e t e d 
w i t h h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n a t t h e t i m e t h e $ 7 7 , 0 0 0 payment was 
made i n F e b r u a r y of 1 9 8 2 . Whether or n o t he was c o m p l e t e d 
w i t h h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h e u n d i s p u t e d f a c t r e m a i n s t h a t a s of 
F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 2 , Hodgson knew of t h e a c c e s s p r o b l e m and 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y d i d n ' t d i s c l o s e t h a t p r o b l e m t o P i o n e e r . By 
p a y i n g P i o n e e r t h e $ 7 7 , 0 0 0 , Hodgson i n t e n d e d t o a v o i d any 
f u t u r e c l a i m on t h e Lake Meadows a c c e s s p r o b l e m . [R. 674A 
l i n e s 1 4 - 2 1 ] T i t l e G u a r a n t e e had a f i d u c i a r y d u t y t o d i s c l o s e 
a l l m a t e r i a l f a c t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e p o l i c y t o P i o n e e r and i t s 
f a i l u r e t o do s o c o n s t i t u t e d c o n s t r u c t i v e f r a u d r e g a r d l e s s of 
T i t l e G u a r a n t e e ' s i n t e n t . B l o d g e t t v . H a r t s c h , 590 P .2d 298 
( U t . 1978) 
I I I . FAILURE TO HITIGATE DAMAGES IS HOT A DEFENSE. 
I n i t s Summary of Argument , T i t l e G u a r a n t e e a p p e a r s t o 
a r g u e t h a t P i o n e e r f a i l e d t o m i t i g a t e damages b e c a u s e i t s 
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appraiser supposedly used the wrong assumption in valuing Lake 
3 
Meadows. However, Title Guarantee does not mention this 
claim in its actual argument. In any event, this argument has 
nothing to do with the mitigation issue. The issue on 
mitigation is whether Pioneer could have obtained alternative 
accesses to attempt to develop Lake Meadows. The undisputed 
evidence was that Pioneer did in fact attempt to obtain other 
accesses. Further, mitigation was not pleaded as a defense 
nor did Respondents present any evidence that Pioneer could 
actually have acquired alternative accesses to mitigate its 
damages. Therefore, the Trial Court's Finding on mitigation 
cannot stand. 
CONCLUSION 
Pioneer was issued a policy of title insurance which 
admittedly failed to disclose, and in fact concealed, the true 
status of title to the Taylor property. Neither Rocky 
Mountain nor Title Guarantee ever even attempted to fulfill 
their fiduciary responsibilities to Pioneer by making a full 
disclosure of the true status of title and the access problem 
Pioneer's appraiser testified that the value of Lake 
Meadows as a subdivision was $144,000, whereas the 
value of Lake Meadows because it is not a valid 
subdivision is in fact $36,000. No contrary evidence 
was produced by Respondents and the Trial Court 
specifically found this value. [R. 405 & 425; Findings 
14-16] Respondents did not appeal these Findings nor 
comply with Rules 74(b) and 75(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure by filing a Statement of Points to be 
relied upon in this appeal. Accordingly, those 
Findings cannot be challenged. 
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or ever attempted to protect Pioneer from the damage which 
Pioneer in fact suffered when it purchased Lake Ileadows in 
reliance upon the title policy. Rather/ all along the way 
Respondents took pains to keep Pioneer in the dark about the 
access problem. The two grounds upon which Title Guarantee's 
attorneys originally denied Pioneer1s claim, after having 
known about and investigated the access problem for months, 
have been abandoned by Title Guarantee and 'were frivolous. 
The new grounds asserted are likewise devoid of merit. 
Respondents simply cannot escape their fiduciary 
responsibilities to Pioneer. The Judgment should be reversed. 
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